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O P I N I ON  
   
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 Jose Luis Flores-Mejia appeals the sentence imposed on him for his conviction of 
the offense of reentry after deportation.  His appeal raises the issue of what a defendant 
must do in order to preserve a challenge to the procedural reasonableness of a sentence.  
At the sentencing hearing, Flores-Mejia made a mitigation argument, based on his 
cooperation with the government.  Flores-Mejia contends that his initial presentation of 
this argument is sufficient, without more, to preserve his claim that the District Court 
committed procedural error by failing, when it pronounced sentence, to give meaningful 
consideration to this argument.  The government counters that Flores-Mejia’s failure to 
object, at a time when the District Court could have promptly addressed it, did not 
preserve the issue for appeal and leaves his claim subject to plain error review.   
 
 We have decided that, to assist the district courts in sentencing, we will develop a 
new rule which is applicable in those situations in which a party has an objection based 
upon a procedural error in sentencing but, after that error has become evident, has not 
stated that objection on the record.   We now hold that in such a situation, when a party 
wishes to take an appeal based on a procedural error at sentencing – such as the court’s 
failure to meaningfully consider that party’s arguments or to explain one or more aspects 
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of the sentence imposed – that party must object to the procedural error complained of 
after sentence is imposed in order to avoid plain error review on appeal.1  Our panel 
holding in United States v. Sevilla, 541 F.3d 226 (3d Cir. 2008), 2 differs from our 
holding today and is superseded. 
 
I.  FACTS 
 Flores-Mejia, a citizen of Mexico, pled guilty to one count of reentry after 
deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a).  This illegal reentry was in fact Flores-
Mejia’s sixth illegal entry into the United States.  Flores-Mejia had an extensive criminal 
record with 18 prior convictions, including several for repeated assaults on his wife.  As 
his attorney admitted at sentencing, “This man has an atrocious record.”  JA103.  Based 
on a criminal history category of VI and an offense level of 21, including a 16-level 
enhancement for a prior violent crime, his Guidelines range was 77 to 96 months in 
prison. 
 
 In his sentencing memorandum, Flores-Mejia raised several grounds for 
downward departures and variances.  At issue here is his argument that he cooperated 
with the government by providing information regarding a homicide and a prostitution 
ring.  At the sentencing hearing, the District Court heard argument on a number of 
Flores-Mejia’s grounds for mitigation and denied them.  The parties then addressed 
Flores-Mejia’s argument that his cooperation warranted a reduced sentence.  Both the 
government and defense counsel made proffers on the issue.  The government argued that 
the homicide in question had already been solved and that the information about the 
prostitution ring did not involve involuntary sex trafficking or children and so it fell 
outside the ordinary purview of federal law enforcement.  For those reasons, the 
government asserted that the cooperation did not warrant a variance. Following this 
colloquy, the District Court stated:  “Okay, thanks.  Anything else?”  There was no reply 
from either party; instead each side summed up its position on sentencing.  On 
completion of the summations, the District Court proceeded to sentence Flores-Mejia to 
78 months in prison.  Defense counsel did not at that time object to the court’s failure to 
rule on the request for variance based on the alleged cooperation, nor did she point out 
the District Court’s failure to explicitly address or give further consideration to that 
argument. 
 
                                                 
1 A party may of course make an objection to a procedural error at an earlier point as 
when, for example, a substantive request is denied and procedurally the defendant has 
objected to a lack of meaningful consideration of that request.  Having already made an 
objection when the procedural error became evident, the defendant need not repeat the 
objection after sentence is imposed. 
2  In so holding, the panel in Sevilla considered itself bound by our prior en banc decision 
in United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556 (2007) (en banc). 
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 Flores-Mejia appealed, contending that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable 
because the District Court failed to sufficiently consider his argument that his attempts at 
cooperation warranted a lower sentence.  Based on our decision in Sevilla, a divided 
panel of this Court agreed.  United States v. Flores-Mejia, 531 F. App’x 222 (3d Cir. 
2013).  We then granted en banc review. 
 
II.  PRESERVING A CLAIM OF PROCEDURAL ERROR FOR APPEAL 
 In United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006), we set forth a three-
step framework for sentencing.  First, a district court must calculate a defendant’s 
Guidelines sentence as it would have before United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 
(2005).  Gunter, 462 F.3d at 247.  Second, a district court must “formally rule on the 
motions of both parties and state on the record whether they are granting a departure and 
how that departure affects the Guidelines calculation, and take into account our Circuit’s 
pre-Booker case law, which continues to have advisory force.”  Id.  (citation, quotation 
marks and alterations omitted).  Third, a district court “[is] required to exercise [its] 
discretion by considering the relevant § 3553(a) factors . . . in setting the sentence [it 
imposes] regardless  whether it varies from the sentence calculated under the 
Guidelines.”  Id.  (internal citation, quotation marks, and alterations omitted).   
 
 To satisfy step three, the district court must “acknowledge and respond to any 
properly presented sentencing argument which has colorable legal merit and a factual 
basis.”  United States v. Begin, 696 F.3d 405, 411 (3d Cir. 2012).  Failure to give 
“meaningful consideration” to any such argument renders a sentence procedurally 
unreasonable which, when appealed, generally requires a remand for resentencing.  Id. 
(internal citation omitted). 
 
 This error of failure to give meaningful consideration must be brought to the 
district court’s attention through an objection.  If a defendant fails to preserve the error 
for appeal by objecting, the authority of the court of appeals to remedy the error is 
“strictly circumscribed.”  Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 134 (2009).  However, 
Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for limited relief:  “A 
plain error that affects substantial rights may be considered even though it was not 
brought to the court’s attention.”   
 
 The issue in this appeal is whether, in order to preserve the objection for appeal 
and to avert plain error review, a defendant must object after the sentence is pronounced 
to the district court’s failure to meaningfully consider his argument.3  In Sevilla, we held 
                                                 
3 Of course, as we set out above, if at any prior point a district court had ruled on the 
request for a variance, the defendant could object to a lack of meaningful consideration of 
the request at that time and there would be no need to do so again after sentence was 
imposed.  
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that “the District Court’s failure to address those issues [when sentence was pronounced] 
did not require Sevilla to re-raise them to avert plain error review of these omissions.”  
Sevilla, 541 F.3d at 231.  However, for the reasons that follow, we now hold that a 
defendant must raise any procedural objection to his sentence at the time the procedural 
error is made, i.e., when sentence is imposed without the court having given meaningful 
review to the objection.  Until sentence is imposed, the error has not been committed.  At 
the time that sentence is imposed, if the objection is made, the court has the opportunity 
to rectify any error by giving meaningful review to the argument.   
 
 We are adopting this new rule for several reasons.  First, we are dealing with a 
procedural objection to the sentencing process.  We must appreciate the difference 
between a challenge to the substantive reasonableness of the sentence and a challenge to 
its procedural reasonableness.  While a substantive objection to the sentence that a court 
will impose is noted when made and need not be repeated after sentencing, a procedural 
objection is to the form that the sentencing procedure has taken, e.g., a court’s failure to 
give meaningful review to a defendant’s substantive arguments.  See United States v. 
Judge, 649 F.3d 453, 458 (6th Cir. 2011).  Unlike a substantive objection to a sentence, a 
procedural defect in a sentence may not occur until the sentence is pronounced, and, 
unless the objection is meaningfully dealt with earlier, no challenge to the sufficiency of 
the court’s explanation can be made until that time.  Simply put, a defendant has no 
occasion to object to the district court’s inadequate explanation of the sentence until the 
district court has inadequately explained the sentence.  Thus, the procedural objection can 
be raised for the first time only after the sentence is pronounced without adequate 
explanation.4   
 
Second, we are satisfied that there are compelling reasons why objecting to 
procedural error after the sentence is pronounced would promote judicial efficiency.  
Objecting when sentence is pronounced permits the quick resolution of such errors.  As 
the Supreme Court observed, “errors are a constant in the trial process,” and when a 
defendant contemporaneously objects, the district court “can often correct or avoid the 
mistake so that it cannot possibly affect the ultimate outcome.”  Puckett, 556 U.S. at 134 
(citation and quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 
214 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[T]he sentencing judge, not the court of appeals, is in a superior 
position to find facts and judge their import under § 3553(a) in the individual case.”) 
                                                 
4 For this reason, the rule we adopt is consistent with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
51(b), i.e., “A party may preserve a claim of error [not giving meaningful consideration 
to the defendant’s argument] by informing the court—when the court ruling or order is 
made or sought [at imposition of sentence]—of the action the party wishes the court to 
take [to give meaningful review to defendant’s argument in connection with sentencing], 
or the party’s objection to the court’s action [failure to give meaningful review to that 
argument] and the grounds for that objection [failure to give meaningful review to that 
argument].”  
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(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 566 
(3d Cir. 2009) (en banc)).  Contemporaneous objection also advances the public interest 
because “[r]equiring the error to be preserved by an objection creates incentives for the 
parties to help the district court meet its obligations to the public and the parties.”  United 
States v. Villafuerte, 502 F.3d 204, 211 (2d Cir. 2007).  By encouraging defendants to 
make objections before the court which is best equipped to resolve the errors efficiently 
and effectively, we are promoting better sentencing practices. 
 
Third, requiring that the procedural objection be made at the time of sentencing 
prevents “sandbagging” of the court by a defendant who remains silent about his 
objection to the explanation of the sentence, only to belatedly raise the error on appeal if 
the case does not conclude in his favor.  See, e.g., Puckett, 556 U.S. at 134. 
 
Our new rule is consistent with the holdings of most other circuit courts of appeals 
that have ruled on the issue.  The First, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. 
Circuit Courts of Appeals all require a defendant to object when sentence is pronounced 
if a district court makes the procedural error of failing to adequately explain a sentence.  
See, e.g., United States v. Davila-Gonzalez, 595 F.3d 42, 47 (1st Cir. 2010); United States 
v. Mondragon-Santiago, 564 F.3d 357, 361 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Vonner, 516 
F.3d 382, 385–86 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc); United States v. Rice, 699 F.3d 1043, 1049 
(8th Cir. 2012); United States v. Rangel, 697 F.3d 795, 805 (9th Cir. 2012); United States 
v. Romero, 491 F.3d 1173, 1177–78 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Wilson, 605 F.3d 
985, 1033–34 (D.C. Cir. 2010).   
 
Only the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals does not consistently require the 
challenge to be raised immediately following the imposition of the sentence by the 
district court.  United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 578–79 (4th Cir. 2010).  The court in 
Lynn reasoned that Rule 51 “does ‘not require a litigant to complain about a judicial 
choice after it has been made.’”  Id. at 578 (quoting United States v. Bartlett, 567 F.3d 
901, 910 (7th Cir. 2009)).5  In reaching its decision, the court in Lynn warned that 
“[r]equiring a party to lodge an explicit objection after the district court explanation 
would saddle busy district courts with the burden of sitting through an objection—
probably formulaic—in every criminal case.”  Lynn, 592 F.3d at 578 (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted). 
 
Under the rule we adopt, there will of course be an objection to a district court’s 
failure to give meaningful consideration to a procedural error in sentencing but it is 
                                                 
5 See footnote 4, supra, for our position that the rule we adopt does not violate Rule 
51(b).  Note also, that although the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in some instances 
has not required an objection to a procedural error at the time sentence was imposed, see, 
e.g., United States v. Cunningham, 429 F.3d  673 (7th Cir. 2005), it has not always done 
so.  See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 604 F.3d 997, 1003 (7th Cir. 2010).  
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hardly a significant impediment to the efficient administration of justice.  Sentencing is a 
complex process, and a district judge at sentencing must meet numerous requirements.  
An objection at sentencing, even if sometimes time-consuming, serves the important 
purpose of reminding the judge of these requirements and allowing the judge to 
immediately remedy omissions or clarify and supplement inadequate explanations.  The 
rule adopted in Lynn and in Sevilla imposes a greater burden on busy district courts by 
depriving them of contemporaneous notice of errors and of the opportunity to correct 
them.  The burden of sitting through an objection at sentencing pales in comparison to the 
time and resources required to correct errors through a lengthy appeal and resentencing.6  
Our strong interest in judicial economy, heightened in these times of fiscal restraint and 
judicial budgetary concerns, weighs heavily in favor of a rule under which the defendant 
must contemporaneously object to concerns regarding the procedural reasonableness of a 
sentence. 
 
 For these reasons, we hold that, in a criminal prosecution, unless a relevant 
objection has been made earlier, a party must object to a procedural error after the 
sentence is pronounced in order to preserve the error and avoid plain error review. 7 8   
 
III.  THE MERITS OF THE APPEAL 
 We have determined that, in order to preserve for appeal the issue of the lack of 
meaningful consideration of his argument on mitigation, Flores-Mejia should have 
objected after sentence was pronounced.  He did not, and thus, under the rule we now 
adopt, he did not preserve the issue for appeal.  An unpreserved issue is reviewed for 
                                                 
6 Resentencing imposes a significant burden on district courts:  not only do they have to 
find time in their busy dockets to revisit errors that could have been resolved with a 
contemporaneous objection at the original sentencing but they also have the burden of 
reconvening the parties involved, including the defendant, attorneys, witnesses, and law 
enforcement authorities.  See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 399 F.3d 450, 459 (2d Cir. 
2005) (warning of the burdens of resentencing, including assuring the presence of the 
defendant, who “will often be serving a sentence at a distant location”). 
 
7 Because defendants sentenced before the issuance of this opinion had not been warned 
that they had a duty to object to the sentencing court’s procedural error after sentencing, 
we will not apply this new rule retroactively. 
 
8 To ensure that timely objections are made, we encourage district courts at sentencing to 
inquire of counsel whether there are any objections to procedural matters.  However, 
unlike the Sixth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals, we will not make this a 
requirement that district judges must follow.  Contra United States v. Bostic, 371 F.3d 
865, 872 (6th Cir. 2004); United States v. Jones, 899 F.2d 1097, 1103 (11th Cir. 1990).  
We believe that the burden of objecting to errors remains with the parties. 
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plain error.  An error is plain if it is “clear” or “obvious,” “affects substantial rights,” and 
“affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”  United States 
v. Dragon, 471 F.3d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 
725, 732, 734 (1993)).  An error “affects substantial rights” when it is prejudicial, that is, 
when it “affected the outcome of the District Court proceedings.”  Id. (quoting Olano, 
507 U.S. at 734); see also United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 262 (2010). 
 
 Because defendants sentenced before the issuance of this opinion had not been 
warned that they had a duty to object to the sentencing court’s procedural error after 
sentencing, we will not apply this new rule retroactively and will, instead, review for 
abuse of discretion.  Applying that standard, we have held that a district court abuses its 
discretion when it fails to give “meaningful consideration” to an argument advanced by 
the defendant.   
 
 Although it’s a close issue, we conclude that the Court’s question (“Ok, thanks.  
Anything else?”) is not on this record sufficient to reflect that meaningful consideration 
was given to Flores-Mejia’s cooperation argument.  The circumstances here are very near 
those we faced in  Sevilla, in which we held that the District Court’s general statement 
that it had “considered all the § 3553(a) factors” was not enough to show meaningful 
consideration of a specific argument.  While the question put by the District Court here, 
in the context of the colloquy as a whole, might be read to reflect that the court had heard 
and considered the specific argument about cooperation, there was no specific ruling 
provided by the court or any other effort to address the argument.   
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the sentence and remand to the District 
Court for resentencing. 
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FUENTES, concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment.  
 
 I agree with the majority that it would be unjust to 
employ the Court’s new rule retroactively, and that we must 
therefore apply the rule articulated in United States v. Sevilla, 
541 F.3d 226 (3d Cir. 2008), to the case at hand.  
Furthermore, I agree that the record before us does not 
suggest that the district court meaningfully considered Flores-
Mejia’s cooperation argument.  Therefore, I concur in the 
decision to remand for resentencing.   
 
But like the dissenters, I continue to believe that 
Sevilla should be applied not just to those sentenced before 
today’s opinion, but also going forward.  As Judge 
Greenaway notes in his compelling opinion, such an outcome 
is dictated by the plain language of Rule 51 of the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure.   
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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge, dissenting with whom 
SMITH, SHWARTZ and SLOVITER, join, and with whom 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge, joins in part. 
  
 In our system of jurisprudence, we examine our 
principle, consider the facts and the law and make decisions.  
The venerable principle of stare decisis requires 
reexamination not when we come up with a better mouse trap 
but when there is a principled basis for change.  See Arizona 
v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984) (“[A]ny departure from 
the doctrine of stare decisis demands special justification.”); 
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833, 854 (1992) (“The obligation to follow precedent begins 
with necessity, and a contrary necessity marks its outer limit. . 
. . At the other extreme, a different necessity would make 
itself felt if a prior judicial ruling should come to be seen so 
clearly as error that its enforcement was for that very reason 
doomed.”).  Indeed, “the very point of stare decisis is to 
forbid us from revisiting a debate every time there are 
reasonable arguments to be made on both sides.”  Morrow v. 
Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 181 (3d Cir. 2013) (Smith, J., 
concurring).   
 Our Court, in a unanimous precedential opinion, 
adopted a procedure for district courts to follow at sentencing 
a scant six years ago.  See United States v. Sevilla, 541 F.3d 
226, 230 (3d Cir. 2008).  Now, without intervening Supreme 
Court precedent and without a majority of our sister courts, 
we not only reexamine but indeed create a new procedure that 
flies in the face of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 51, 
with no compulsion or mandate to do so.     
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 In its attempt to promote judicial economy, the 
majority ignores the plain language of Rule 51, misreads the 
state of the law of our sister circuits, 1  and invokes a 
                                              
1 The majority would have us believe that a tsunami of well-
reasoned opinions has swept across our sister circuits, 
requiring us to question our own precedent; however, close 
reading of case law reveals that this assessment is mistaken.  
For instance, the D.C. Circuit’s explications provide no 
succor to the majority’s view, given that the court has 
rendered internally inconsistent decisions.  Compare, e.g., 
United States v. Wilson, 605 F.3d 985, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
(“Where a defendant failed to make a timely objection to the 
alleged procedural error in the district court, however, our 
review is for plain error.”), with United States v. Tate, 630 
F.3d 194, 197-99 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (applying the “abuse of 
discretion” standard to review a claim that a “sentence is 
procedurally unreasonable, in violation of due process and the 
requirement of section 3553(a) that a sentence be no greater 
than necessary”) and United States v. Bras, 483 F.3d 103, 113 
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (applying the reasonableness standard of 
review by rejecting the government’s insistence that the court 
“may review this claim only for ‘plain error,’ because Bras 
did not . . . object that the court did not adequately consider 
the factors set forth in § 3553” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  The majority also omits cases that have 
unequivocally rejected the approach adopted today.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Castro-Juarez, 425 F.3d 430, 434 (7th Cir. 
2005) (“Since the district court will already have heard 
argument and allocution from the parties and weighed the 
relevant § 3553(a) factors before pronouncing sentence, we 
fail to see how requiring the defendant to then protest the 
term handed down as unreasonable will further the sentencing 
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fundamental change to our sentencing procedures that is both 
unwarranted and difficult to square with the Supreme Court’s 
post-Booker jurisprudence.  For this reason, I respectfully 
dissent.2   
I. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
 Under the Rules Enabling Act, Congress vested the 
Supreme Court of the United States with the authority to 
promulgate the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.  See 
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
559 U.S. 393, 406-07 (2010).  These rules, which are then 
enacted by Congress, are legislation and therefore transcend a 
mere rule of court.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 2; see also Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 1(a)(1) (“These rules govern the procedure in all criminal 
proceedings in the United States district courts, the United 
States courts of appeals, and the Supreme Court of the United 
States.”).   
                                                                                                     
process in any meaningful way.”).  Finally, the case law cited 
by the majority in support of their new rule, except for United 
States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 391 (6th Cir. 2008) (which is 
addressed below), completely fails to take into account Rule 
51’s procedure for preserving an issue for appeal.  As a result, 
these cases do not provide a reasoned analysis supporting the 
majority’s approach. 
2 Sevilla provided clear guidance in this post-Booker world, 
the District Court considered all of the arguments raised at 
sentencing.  The Government determined that the information 
Flores-Mejia had provided did not warrant a departure motion 
under U.S.S.G. 5K1.1.  When the District Judge said 
“anything else”, he had already heard from both sides.  
Therefore, I would affirm the sentence. 
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 Because the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are 
legislative enactments, “we turn to the ‘traditional tools of 
statutory construction,’ . . . in order to construe their 
provisions.”  Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 
163 (1988) (quoting INS v. Cardoza–Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 
446 (1987)).  “We begin with the language of the Rule itself.”  
Beech Aircraft Corp., 488 U.S. at 163.  
 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 51, which governs 
how parties preserve claims for appeal, states that “[a] party 
may preserve a claim of error by informing the court--when 
the court ruling or order is made or sought--of the action the 
party wishes the court to take, or the party’s objection to the 
court’s action and the grounds for that objection.”  Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 51(b).   
   Textually, Rule 51(b) contemplates that parties may 
liberally preserve claims for appeal.  The rule states that a 
party preserves a claim by informing the court “the action the 
party wishes the court to take . . . when the court ruling or 
order is made or sought[.]”  Id. (emphasis added).  While 
“made” denotes that a request (e.g., objection) can be raised 
after the order, the “or sought” language anticipates a party 
preserving a claim prior to the court’s ruling.  “To seek” 
means “to ask for” or “to try to obtain,” which necessarily 
takes place prior to the court’s ruling.  See, e.g., Webster’s 
Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 1063 (1983) (“to ask for”); 
The Random House Dictionary of the English Language 1733 
(2d ed. 1987) (“To try to obtain”). 
 The majority gives no more than lip service to the text 
of Rule 51(b).  In a footnote, the majority claims that the new 
rule implemented by the court today is “consistent” with Rule 
51(b) on grounds that the procedural objection can be raised 
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for the first time only after the sentence is pronounced 
without adequate explanation. 3   Such a reading can be 
sustained only by conflating “objection” with “the action the 
party wishes the court to take”, which defies an established 
canon of statutory interpretation that terms connected by a 
disjunctive are to be given separate meaning.  See Reiter v. 
Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979) (“Canons of 
construction ordinarily suggest that terms connected by a 
disjunctive be given separate meanings[.]”).  Under the plain 
language of Rule 51, an objection—which can indeed only 
take place after the court’s ruling—is only one way, not “the” 
way, to preserve a claim.  The rule expressly provides that 
parties may also preserve a claim for appeal when they 
inform the court “of the action the party wishes the court to 
take[.]”  Fed. R. Crim. P. 51(b). 
 That is exactly what Flores-Mejia has done here.  In 
his sentencing memorandum dated July 19, 2012 (App. 51, 
55, 59), and again at the sentencing hearing on July 26, 2012, 
defense counsel urged the Court to “consider [Flores-Mejia’s] 
                                              
3 This line of reasoning follows the approach developed by 
Judge Sutton’s majority opinion in Vonner, which 
(unsurprisingly) also pays little homage to the text of Rule 51.  
Vonner, 516 F.3d at 391.  The opinion there acknowledges 
Rule 51.  Id. at 391.  But the court then supports its 
application of plain error review of the district court’s failure 
to address the four grounds Vonner specifically raised for a 
downward variance by positing a hypothetical where the 
mistake had never been presented to the district court.  Id. at 
392.  The hypothetical, however, lends no support because it 
is factually distinguishable from what actually occurred in the 
case.   
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actions in proffering [to the Government].”  (App. 102-03.)  It 
is settled law that consideration of § 3553(a) factors requires 
the District Court to supply an explanation.  See United States 
v. Begin, 696 F.3d 405, 411 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding that in 
order to consider the relevant sentencing factors set forth in 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the District Court must “acknowledge 
and respond to any properly presented sentencing argument”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. 
Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 571 (3d Cir. 2007) (“The record must 
disclose meaningful consideration of the relevant statutory 
factors[.]”).  Because Flores-Mejia “sought” the District 
Court to “consider” § 3553(a) factors, his claim was 
preserved under Rule 51, regardless of whether the District 
Court ruled upon his request.  
 What the majority calls an “objection” is in reality an 
“exception,” which Rule 51(a) expressly declared as 
“unnecessary.”  Fed. R. Crim. P. 51(a); see also United States 
v. Bartlett, 567 F.3d 901, 910 (7th Cir. 2009) (Easterbrook, J.) 
(“We put ‘object’ in scare quotes because remonstration with 
the judge is not an objection as usually understood. . . .  Such 
a complaint is properly called, not an objection, but an 
exception.”).  Prior to the adoption of Rule 51(a), lawyers 
followed a common law tradition of taking “exception” to an 
adverse ruling to preserve an issue.  Robert E. Keeton, Trial 
Tactics and Methods § 4.12, at 190-91 (2d ed. 1973).  This 
tradition was a way of creating a record for effective appellate 
court review.  Id.  When verbatim transcripts became 
available for modern judicial proceedings, the formalistic 
“exception” requirement was no longer necessary for 
appellate courts to effectively review cases.  See Benjamin K. 
Raybin, Note, “Objection: Your Honor is Being 
Unreasonable!” - Law and Policy Opposing the Federal 
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Sentencing Order Objection Requirement, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 
235, 252 (2010).  It was for this reason that the practice of 
taking exceptions was abandoned in civil cases when 
Congress approved Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 46 (in 
1937) and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 51 (in 
1944).  Id.; see also Bartlett, 567 F.3d at 910 (“[T]he rules do 
not require a litigant to complain about a judicial choice after 
it has been made.”); United States v. Cunningham, 429 F.3d 
673, 679-80 (7th Cir. 2005) (Posner, J.) (“[A] lawyer in 
federal court is not required to except to rulings by the trial 
judge.”) (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 51(a)). 
 The majority insists that a party must re-raise any 
procedural objection after the pronouncement of the sentence 
to avoid plain error review.  No such requirement appears in 
Rule 51.  In adopting this “new rule,” the majority renders 
superfluous both Rule 51(a)’s elimination of the practice of 
taking exceptions and Rule 51(b)’s disjunctive text “or 
sought.”  Although courts are to avoid a construction of a 
statute that would make another provision superfluous, the 
majority ignores this basic rule of statutory construction.  See 
Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 249 (1998) (noting its 
“reluctan[ce] to adopt a construction making another statutory 
provision superfluous”); see also Colautti v. Franklin, 439 
U.S. 379, 392 (1979) (characterizing as “elementary” the 
“canon of construction that a statute should be interpreted so 
as not to render one part inoperative”).   
 Rule 51 cannot be deemed superfluous based on the 
procedural/substantive dichotomy.  While it is true that this 
Court has developed jurisprudence highlighting the difference 
between procedural and substantive reasonableness claims, 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not make such a 
distinction.  The majority’s reading carves out certain 
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categories of claims that cannot be preserved when the ruling 
“is sought”, failing to give meaning to each word of Rule 
51(b).  In my view, this reading cannot survive scrutiny by 
the Supreme Court.  See Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, 
P.A., 559 U.S. at 406 (interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure stating that courts “cannot contort its text[.]”); 
Reiter, 442 U.S. at 339 (“In construing a statute we are 
obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word Congress 
used.”). 
II. Judicial Economy  
 The majority attempts to rationalize its reading of Rule 
51 by pointing to judicial economy.  While the concern is 
noble, the effect of the new rule on judicial economy is at best 
ambiguous.     
 First, contrary to the majority’s concern about defense 
counsel “sandbagging”  district courts, parties already have an 
incentive to bring errors to the district court’s attention even 
when a claim is preserved.4  This is because they have a better 
shot at correcting errors there than before an appellate court 
that must review under a deferential, reasonableness standard.  
                                              
4 In Puckett v. United States, the Supreme Court instructed 
that a party cannot “remain[] silent” and “sandbag” a court by 
failing to object and avert plain error review.  556 U.S. 129, 
135 (2009).  Unlike Puckett, where the defendant never raised 
the issue at all in the district court, when a party raises his 
argument in writing prior to sentencing and orally advocates 
for particular action at the sentencing hearing, it is inaccurate 
to contend that the party is sandbagging the sentencing court 
and that the issues he squarely raised are subject to plain error 
review. 
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United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 564 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(assessing the reasonableness of a sentence under the 
deferential “abuse of discretion” standard of review).  Under 
the reasonableness standard, an appellate court reverses only 
when the district court’s decision cannot be located within the 
range of permissible decisions or is based on a legal error or 
clearly erroneous factual finding.  See id.  While the plain 
error standard certainly heightens the penalty for failure to 
preserve an issue, the majority’s approach does not explain 
why an abuse of discretion standard cannot deter parties from 
“playing possum.”  Certainly, there is no evidence, anecdotal 
or otherwise, to support the majority’s assessment.  
 Second, requiring an objection for preservation 
purposes will slow down the process in the initial district 
court proceeding, even when it may not be necessary.  As the 
Seventh Circuit puts it, “[t]o insist that defendants object at 
sentencing to preserve appellate review for reasonableness 
would create a trap for unwary defendants and saddle busy 
district courts with the burden of sitting through an 
objection—probably formulaic—in every criminal case.”  
United States v. Castro-Juarez, 425 F.3d 430, 433-34 (7th 
Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 578-
79 & n.3 (4th Cir. 2010) (observing that the objection 
requirement “could degenerate into a never-ending stream of 
objections after each sentencing explanation”).  All this 
presumably after a full airing out of the issue at hand both in 
the papers and at argument.  This concern is especially 
alarming because substantive and procedural reasonableness 
claims are not easily divisible.  Compare Rita v. United 
States, 551 U.S. 338, 365 (2007) (Stevens, J., concurring) 
(observing that Booker “plainly contemplated that 
reasonableness review would contain a substantive [as well as 
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procedural] component”), with Rita, 551 U.S. at 382-83 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
(observing that reasonableness of sentencing ruling should be 
reviewed on purely procedural grounds).  See also Vonner, 
516 F.3d at 398 (Clay, J., dissenting) (“[P]rocedural 
reasonableness and substantive reasonableness are simply two 
aspects of the overall reasonableness.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  The difficulty of parsing out the differences 
between substantive and procedural claims incentivizes 
counsel to complain about every ruling made by the district 
court.  
 Third, requiring an objection to preserve issues for an 
appeal promises to give birth to an industry of collateral 
“ineffective assistance of counsel” claims that are likely to 
arise out of defense counsel inevitably failing to object after 
sentencing in some cases.  See, e.g., Raybin, Note, 63 Vand. 
L. Rev. at 262 (“By creating a new procedure for attorneys to 
follow, courts also create a new way in which attorneys can 
render ineffective assistance of counsel.”).  This is not a mere 
theoretical inquiry, given our Court’s previous ruling that 
failing to object in certain circumstances may constitute 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Otero, 502 F.3d 331, 336 (3d Cir. 2007) (“There is no sound 
strategy in counsel’s failure to object to the 16-level 
enhancement in the PSR. . . . We therefore find counsel’s 
performance deficient.”).5   
 To be sure, requiring procedural reasonableness 
objections may facilitate speedier resolution of errors in 
                                              
5 Our discussion does not address the circumstances when 
defense counsel fails to raise a claim for a court to consider in 
writing and before actual sentencing.  
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certain circumstances, sparing everyone the lengthy process 
of appellate review.  If alacrity be our keystone, I shall step 
aside, but in the grand scheme of our criminal justice system, 
judicial economy should not and cannot rule our 
considerations. 
III. Appellate Review Post-Booker   
 Finally, the holding rendered by the majority today 
represents a fundamental change in our jurisprudence that is 
difficult to square with the Supreme Court’s post-Booker 
jurisprudence.  
 Our Booker obligation is to “review sentencing 
decisions for unreasonableness.”  United States v. Booker, 
543 U.S. 220, 264 (2005).  In keeping with this guidance, this 
Court has developed a two-part test, reviewing for 
“procedural error at each step of the district court’s 
sentencing process . . .  then we move forward to the second 
stage [reviewing] the substantive reasonableness of the 
sentence.”  Begin, 696 F.3d at 411; see also Rita, 551 U.S. at 
356 (instructing that a sentencing court should “set forth 
enough to satisfy the appellate court that [he] has considered 
the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising 
his own legal decision-making authority”).   
 Under the plain error review adopted by the majority 
today,6 our hands will be tied when the district court fails to 
                                              
6 An error is plain if it is “clear” or “obvious,” “affects 
substantial rights,” and “affects the fairness, integrity or 
public reputation of judicial proceedings.”  United States v. 
Dragon, 471 F.3d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting United 
States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993) (alterations and 
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produce enough of a record for meaningful procedural 
review, for we will have no basis to ascertain whether a 
potential error could have “affected the outcome of the 
district court proceedings.”  Dragon, 471 F.3d at 505 (quoting 
Olano, 507 U.S. at 732).  This is plainly at odds with the 
Supreme Court’s instructions that the record “make[] clear 
that the sentencing judge considered the evidence and 
arguments.”  Rita, 551 U.S. at 359.   
 For example, assume that the district court commits a 
procedural error—by incorrectly calculating the defendant’s 
advisory Guidelines range. 7   Let us even assume that the 
district court was generous enough to ask, after the imposition 
of the sentence, if counsel had any objections.  Defense 
counsel answered “no” to that question.  Under the majority’s 
hard-line rule, the mere fact that the defense counsel 
answered “no” absolves the district court of what we have 
time and time again re-affirmed as the district court’s 
responsibility under Gunter.  This is particularly alarming 
because of the unique, two-step review process developed in 
our circuit.  Our substantive review is “highly deferential,” 
                                                                                                     
internal quotation marks omitted)).  An error “affects 
substantial rights” when it is prejudicial, that is, when it 
“affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.”  
Dragon, 471 F.3d at 505 (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 734). 
7 Correct calculation of the defendant’s advisory Guidelines 
range is the first procedural step mandated by our seminal 
post-Booker opinion.  United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 
247 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[O]ur post-Booker precedent instructs 
district courts . . . to calculate a defendant’s Guidelines 
sentence precisely as they would have before Booker.”) 
(internal citations omitted).  
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only because of “our insistence, as part of our procedural 
review, that the district court produce a record sufficient to 
demonstrate its rational and meaningful consideration of the § 
3553(a) factors.”  Begin, 696 F.3d at 411.  The majority’s 
opinion strips future panels of meaningful authority to ensure 
that district courts follow the Gunter steps, while leaving the 
deferential substantive review standard intact.  In effect, this 
approach undermines our ability to “review sentencing 
decisions for unreasonableness.”  Booker, 543 U.S. at 264. 
 The insistence that a claim be lodged 
“contemporaneously” with a sentencing decision exacerbates 
the problem.  The majority’s approach, in essence, picks a 
narrow and arbitrary point in time at which a defense counsel 
must raise (or in some instances, re-raise) a point, building an 
additional stricture that defeats a defendant’s ability to 
successfully appeal.  Sentencing proceedings are highly 
charged and fraught with emotion, particularly after the 
sentence is imposed.  It is unwise to burden counsel with the 
additional obligations to engage in a reasoned analysis of the 
district court’s sentencing explanation and then interpose an 
objection that was already asserted, all while attending to an 
emotional client and raising residual issues, like surrender 
dates and place of incarceration.   
 Under the majority’s framework, future panels of this 
Court will be forced to make a difficult choice when faced 
with a district court record that is plainly at odds with our 
instructions in Gunter: (1) apply plain error review and 
produce rulings that are likely to be at odds with the guidance 
from the Supreme Court; or (2) stretch the meaning of “plain 
error” to ensure that this Court follows the Supreme Court’s 
post-Booker jurisprudence.  Begin, 696 F.3d at 411.   
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 The post-Vonner jurisprudence from the Sixth Circuit 
gives little reason for optimism.  In U.S. v. Wallace, for 
instance, the Sixth Circuit was asked to review a record from 
the District Court that did not “specifically mention any of the 
3553(a) factors.”  597 F.3d 794, 804 (6th Cir. 2010).  Even 
after acknowledging that “plain error review should be 
extremely deferential to the sentencing judge”, the court 
found that the case “must be remanded for re-sentencing.”  Id.  
But as Judge McKeague’s concurring opinion insightfully 
points out, it is untenable to conclude that the district court’s 
lack of explanation impugned the “fairness, integrity or public 
reputation” necessary to constitute plain error.  597 F.3d at 
811 (McKeague, J., concurring).   
 I end where I began.  Stare decisis counsels against 
“overrul[ing] our circuit precedent just to move from one side 
of the conflict to another.”  United States v. Conner, 598 F.3d 
411, 414 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc).  Yet, despite the plain text 
of Rule 51(b) and the absence of any intervening authority 
from the Supreme Court, the majority jumps to the other side.  
What could confuse our district court colleagues more than 
revisiting matters without good cause to do so and 
establishing a new procedure that digress from 
congressionally sanctioned rules with no substantive or 
procedural infirmity?  I cannot partake in such an enterprise, 
and therefore respectfully dissent.    
